Criminal Justice and the Human Rights Framework

For much of the modern history of international law, how states arrest, detain, try and punish their own citizens was considered a matter of sovereign, domestic jurisdiction that did not fall under external scrutiny from the international community. Through historic struggles, political compromises and normative differences, an international framework that guides criminal justice was created. This section explores the history of the international legal framework and examines its monitoring and enforcement in practice.

From Sovereignty to International Oversight: A Brief History

Before the 20th century, the idea that international law would to some degree govern how states deal with and treat their own criminal suspects and prisoners was considered a violation of the principle of state sovereignty. Dating back to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the principle of non-interference in internal affairs had been established, with few exceptions (e.g. consular protection of foreign nationals and the slow emergence of standards for the treatment of prisoners of war) that left domestic criminal justice almost completely unregulated by the international order.

This changed following the Second World War, when states committed large-scale atrocities against their own citizens, disrupting the previous status quo. The Nuremberg trials established the principle that an individual could be held criminally responsible under international law for acts committed against civilians, including their own nationals. This led to an international consensus that persons require protection from state power regardless of nationality and that this cannot solely be left to domestic legal systems. It materialised through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and translated into binding treaty form through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), providing criminal justice provisions that, inter alia, include fair trial rights, prohibition on arbitrary detention, and restrictions on the death penalty.

The regional systems followed their own historical contexts. The ECHR (1950) was shaped by the experience of European totalitarianism and the Council of Europe to prevent a similar situation from happening again, but also, as Demir-Gürsel notes, to go beyond a ‘collective pact against totalitarianism’. The criminal justice provisions of the ECHR in particular, were aimed at ensuring that atrocities committed would not be repeated and that, instead, fundamental rights would be safeguarded. The Inter-American system developed against a backdrop of military dictatorship and disappearances across Latin America, requiring the need for a regional system to address systematic impunity for state violence exercised through the criminal justice system. The African Charter is shaped by the post-colonial state-building and the legacy of the colonial criminal justice systems that required African approaches to rights and justice following decades of racial domination.

To understand the current human rights framework and its influence on both domestic and international criminal justice, it is important to situate it in this historical context. The international human rights standards for criminal justice were not derived from abstract principles but were based on political situations in which various actors had their own interests and agendas. Tomuschat observes that the ICCPR reflects tensions based on the Cold War, resulting in compromises that continue to affect the development of the law today. Similarly, the regional systems reflect their respective regions’ histories of rights violations. Taking this into consideration allows an examination of the current framework that recognises any strengths and blind spots from previous eras.

The international criminal justice framework has been significantly developed since the 1990s, not least through ad-hoc mechanisms like the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, as well as the first permanent international criminal tribunal, the International Criminal Court. With this expansion alongside further development of human rights treaty bodies and special procedures, General Comments and thematic reports, all of which have an effect on the coherence and fragmentation of international human rights regulation over criminal justice, the relationship between norm development and state behaviour is impacted.

Monitoring Criminal Justice in Practice

Understanding the human rights framework for criminal justice requires the consideration of how obligations are monitored and enforced in practice, thus going beyond the treaty texts. Though a general feature of international human rights law, the gap between formal obligation and practical reality is particularly prominent in the criminal justice system. This can be traced back to the previous lack of external scrutiny of domestic systems, and it being a resource-intensive area. Nevertheless, there are procedures in place to monitor states’ approaches to criminal justice.

The most common monitoring mechanism is the state reporting procedure, allowing states to submit periodic reports to treaty bodies to evidence how obligations are implemented domestically. This mechanism is used by several different treaty bodies (see Chapter on the UN System). This is a universal mechanism that applies to all state parties and allows for ongoing dialogue between states and monitoring bodies. As the reporting procedures rely on state cooperation, however, serious criminal justice problems like torture in detention or denial of legal aid may remain concealed by states.

Whilst the state reporting procedure is the most common monitoring mechanism, the individual complaint or communication procedure has produced a significant body of criminal justice jurisprudence. Individuals can bring rights violation complaints under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the Optional Protocol to CAT, and petition the regional systems. The ECtHR’s case law is particularly extensive on Articles 5 and 6 ECHR, and the IACtHR produced important jurisprudence on detention conditions and fair trial rights. However, there are limitations to the individual complaint mechanism. The admissibility criteria can create barriers for many applicants and even following a decision, a state’s compliance can vary.

For issues of torture in particular, the preventive visit model was introduced by OPCAT and its Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT), alongside the regional Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) in Europe. A fundamentally different, proactive approach to torture prevention prioritises detention facility visits and confidential dialogue with states. The CPT has thus been central to the development of standards for various criminal justice issues, and, whilst not legally binding, carries normative authority and has influenced ECtHR jurisprudence and domestic reform.

In addition, Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups appointed by the Human Rights Council produce thematic reports that analyse specific criminal justice issues, such as racial disparities in sentencing, the use of solitary confinement, or the compatibility of the death penalty with the right to life. Special Rapporteurs can also conduct country visits and query specific cases, allowing for a swifter mechanism to monitor criminal justice concerns.

The Principle of Legality: Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege

A central pillar of the rule of law in the criminal context is the principle of legality, expressed in the maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege: no crime or punishment without law. This principle is codified in Article 15 ICCPR, Article 7 ECHR, Article 9 ACHR, and Article 7(2) ACHPR. It prohibits the retroactive creation or expansion of criminal offences and requires that criminal laws be sufficiently clear and foreseeable for individuals to understand what conduct is prohibited. The ECtHR has developed influential jurisprudence on this point, notably in Kokkinakis v Greece, which stressed that laws must be formulated with enough precision to allow individuals to regulate their conduct. The UN Human Rights Committee has similarly interpreted Article 15 to forbid reliance on vague or broadly framed offences in the context of capital punishment. In addition, both Article 15(2) ICCPR and Article 7(2) ECHR contain an exception permitting prosecution for acts that were criminal ‘according to the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations’ even where no specific domestic or international provision criminalised them at the time. This exception to non-retroactivity was inserted specifically to preserve the legality of the Nuremberg prosecutions, and raises questions concerning the retrospective criminalisation of conduct that was prohibited but not legally defined as such. This tension is reflected in Korbely v Hungary. This case raised the important question of whether the conduct in question constituted a crime against humanity under international law as it stood in 1956 – specifically, whether the victim qualified as a protected person under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and whether the act was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack. The Court found a violation of Article 7, holding that the domestic courts had not established with the requisite clarity that the killing satisfied the definition of a crime against humanity under the international law applicable at the time, and that the applicant’s conviction therefore rested on a legal basis that was insufficiently foreseeable and accessible. A contrasting outcome has been reached by the ECtHR in Kononov v Latvia. In this case, the Court found no violation of Article 7, holding that the acts in question constituted war crimes under customary international law as it existed in 1944, and that it was sufficiently foreseeable at the time that the killing of protected civilians during armed conflict was criminalised under international law. Together, these cases illustrate the inherent tension within the legality principle itself: the Article 7(2) ECHR and Article 15(2) ICCPR exceptions preserve space for accountability for the gravest international crimes, but the Court’s divergent outcomes in Korbely and Kononov demonstrate that the line between legitimate retrospective prosecution and impermissible retroactive criminalisation is difficult to assess.

Substantive Constraints on Criminal Legislation

International human rights law also imposes substantive constraints on what states may criminalise, ensuring that criminal law does not become a tool of repression. Criminal prohibitions must comply with protected rights, such as freedom of expression (Article 19 ICCPR), privacy (Article 17 ICCPR), and non-discrimination (Article 26 ICCPR), and any restriction must meet the criteria of legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality. Courts frequently strike down or restrict criminal provisions that are vague, overbroad, or that disproportionately interfere with fundamental rights. For example, in Sunday Times v United Kingdom, the ECtHR emphasised that vague laws undermine legal certainty. The Inter-American Court has similarly condemned overly broad criminalisation of dissent and association in cases such as Kimel v Argentina, finding that criminal defamation laws violated freedom of expression because they were neither necessary, nor proportionate. Human rights bodies also assess discriminatory or status-based criminal laws as incompatible with equality guarantees, such as those targeting sexual orientation or minority groups. Thus, while states possess discretion in defining criminal offences, international human rights law ensures that criminal legislation remains consistent with legality, proportionality, and fundamental rights.

Fair Trial Guarantees in International Human Rights Law

Doswald-Beck contends that fair trials are ‘one of the fundamental pillars of international law to protect individuals against arbitrary treatment’. The right to a fair trial is therefore considered a fundamental human right which ensures the administration of justice. The almost universal acceptance of fair trial rights guarantees in international human rights treaties leads to violations of rights being frequently litigated before domestic and international courts (OCHR HR/P/PT/9/Add.1). Particularly in the domestic context, ensuring that fair trial rights are respected is not only essential for the individual’s rights, but also for society as a whole in terms of upholding the principle of legality, respecting the rule of law, and supporting democratic values. Considering violations of fair trial rights are more likely in states where the separation of powers is blurred, where a judiciary is a mere tool of the executive, international human rights bodies need to address these violations (OCHR HR/PUB/14/7). It is based on these considerations that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Guy Malary v Haiti states that ‘[t]he right to a fair trial is one of the fundamental pillars of a democratic society. This right is a basic guarantee of respect for the other rights recognized in the Convention, because it limits abuse of power by the State’. Compliance with fair trial guarantees is mostly relevant regarding criminal proceedings, as this is where the individual is particularly vulnerable. However, under international human rights law, it also includes civil proceedings and can extend to administrative and disciplinary proceedings.

The Treaty Framework and its Guarantees

International human rights law protects the right to a fair and public hearing through a set of consistent guarantees found across universal and regional instruments. The most comprehensive universal statement of fair trial rights is found in Article 14 of the ICCPR, which is a cornerstone of the Covenant’s criminal justice provisions. Article 14 contains a comprehensive set of guarantees: equality before courts and tribunals; the right to a fair and public hearing before a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law; the presumption of innocence; the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charge; adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; the right to legal assistance, including free legal aid where necessary; the right to examine or have examined witnesses; the right to an interpreter; the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself; and the right to appeal to a higher tribunal. General Comment No. 32 (2007), the Committee’s most authoritative and detailed interpretation of Article 14, addresses each of these guarantees and is the essential reference point for understanding the scope of the universal fair trial standard. In addition, Article 10 UDHR guarantees the right to a fair trial and Article 11 UDHR determines that everyone is innocent until proven guilty. These civil and political rights provide protection from unlawful government intervention by allocating rights to a suspect in a criminal case.

These universal standards are reinforced regionally through Article 6 ECHR, Article 8 ACHR, and Article 7 ACHPR. The right to a fair trial in Article 6 ECHR has generated an abundance of case law from the ECtHR, which Jessurun d’Oliveira notes, reflects the importance of the criminal justice system to the experiences of human rights violations in Europe. Article 8 of the ACHR addresses judicial guarantees and the principle of legality. The IACtHR has developed important jurisprudence on fair trial rights that draws extensively on the ICCPR and ECHR while also reflecting the particular challenges of criminal justice in Latin America, such as the use of military tribunals to try civilians, and the role of prosecutorial discretion in producing impunity. While Article 7 ACHR contains important aspects of fair trial guarantees, it is not as extensive in its protection as the other treaties by e.g. omitting the right to free legal aid and the right to examine witnesses.

Independent and Impartial Tribunal

The right to an independent and impartial tribunal is the most structurally important of the fair trial guarantees, since its absence undermines the legitimacy of all other procedural rights. Judicial independence concerns the structural and functional autonomy of the judiciary from the executive, legislature, and other private interests. This is enshrined in Principle 1 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary , which states that ‘[t]he independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary’. The requirement for an independent and impartial tribunal is a cornerstone of the broader right to a fair hearing in both criminal and civil proceedings. This guarantee is set out in Article 14(1) ICCPR, Article 6(1) ECHR, Article 8(1) ACHR, and Articles 7(1)(a) and 26 ACHPR. Further, the UN General Assembly has highlighted that ‘an independent judiciary and legal profession in full conformity with applicable standards contained in international human rights instruments, are essential to the full and non-discriminatory realization of human rights and indispensable to democratization processes and sustainable development’ (UN General Assembly  A/RES/50/181). These norms reflect the idea that justice must be administered by a body that is free from improper influence and capable of deciding cases based solely on law and evidence. Often, the requirements of independence and impartiality are seen as interlinked and the ECtHR, for example, often considers both together.

For a tribunal to be independent, General Comment No. 32 distinguishes between two types of independence: institutional and individual. The institutional independence refers to the independence of the judiciary from the other branches of government. Importantly, the judiciary’s independence extends to the decision-making, ensuring that ‘[t]here shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision’ (Principle 4 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary). This independence further extends to judges, who ‘have a right to enjoy independence in carrying out their professional duties’ which must be protected through appointment procedures and tenure, safeguards against arbitrary removal, as well as adequate financial security, training and the right to freedom of expression (OCHR HR/P/PT/9/Add.1). Institutional arrangements should guarantee the separation of powers and ensure that judges are shielded from external pressure or interference. International instruments, such as the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, further articulate these standards, and treaty bodies regularly assess whether states have embedded such protections in law and practice. Judicial impartiality requires tribunals to be neutral in both fact and appearance. This has two dimensions: subjective impartiality, which focuses on whether the judge has demonstrated actual bias, and objective impartiality, which looks at whether the circumstances create a reasonable perception of bias (Daktaras v Lithuania, ECtHR). Impartiality may be compromised by personal conflicts of interest, previous involvement of the judge in related proceedings, or conduct suggesting a predisposition. International courts emphasise that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done, and therefore, even the appearance of bias can violate human rights standards. A further dimension of this requirement concerns the use of special, military, or administrative tribunals.

As the Human Rights Committee noted in General Comment No.32, the standards laid out above ‘apply to all courts and tribunals within the scope of [Article 14 ICCPR], whether ordinary or specialized, civilian or military’. The Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers notes that military tribunals, in particular, frequently give rise to concerns regarding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Such tribunals are not automatically incompatible with human rights standards; they must provide guarantees equivalent to ordinary courts, and ensure they meet the safeguards required under Article 14 of the ICCPR and applicable regional treaties. In Findlay v United Kingdom, the ECtHR applied both objective and subjective tests of impartiality. Here, the Court found that the structural dependence of military judges on the convening officer, who could dissolve the tribunal and was responsible for the prosecution, was incompatible with the objective impartiality required in Article 6(1) ECHR. The African Commission addressed judicial independence in Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, where it found that the trial of civilians before a military tribunal, whose decisions could not be appealed to a civil court, violated Article 7(1)(a) ACHPR.

Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence is one of the most widely recognised fair trial guarantees. As stated in Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty’. This presumption of innocence is an explicit requirement of Article 14(2) ICCPR, Article 6(2) ECHR, Article 8(2) ACHR, Article 7(1)(b) ACHPR, and Article 16 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights. In Zegarra Marín v Peru, the IACtHR highlighted that ‘the presumption of innocence is a guiding principle in criminal trials and a foundational standard for the assessment of the evidence’ and that ‘such assessment must be rational, objective, and impartial in order to disprove the presumption of innocence and generate certainty about criminal responsibility’. One of the requirements of the presumption of innocence is that the burden of proof in criminal proceedings lies with the state. This was also found by the HRC in J.O. v France, where the Committee referred to General Comment No. 32 and required the prosecution to establish the guilt of an individual. General Comment No. 32 also affirmed that the presumption of innocence applies not only to the conduct of courts but to legislative and executive actors.

Right to Equality

The right to equality before courts and tribunals ensures equal access to courts and equal treatment before them without discrimination. It also ensures equality of arms, guaranteeing that all parties have the same procedural rights and that any distinctions are based on law, justified, and do not disadvantage the defendant. While the equality of arms is not explicitly stated in human rights treaties, it is enshrined in its fair trial guarantees and has been developed by its institutions as an implicit requirement. In Dombo Beheer v The Netherlands, the ECtHR stated that equality of arms is an inherent element of fair trial guarantees which ‘implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case – including his evidence – under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent’. General Comment No. 32 also affirms that the principle of equality between the prosecution and defence must be respected throughout the proceedings.

This right to equality also extends to free interpretation, where parties can otherwise not participate in the proceedings. The HRC raised this in regard to Tamil-speaking individuals in Sri Lanka who do not have access to justice due to the lack of interpretation and translation services, recommending the provision of those free services for all defendants.

This is further related to the right to legal assistance, which is a minimum guarantee in criminal proceedings and enshrined in Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR and Article 6(3)(c) ECHR. This also encompasses legal aid; in the concluding observations on the second periodic report of Uganda, the HRC was concerned by the low quality of state-funded legal assistance and that access to legal aid was restricted to capital offences. The Committee recommended that access to justice be ensured on equal footing for all, including free legal aid to those in need in accordance with Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR. The ECtHR also addresses the qualitative dimension of the right to legal assistance in Artico v Italy, holding that the Convention requires the provision of practical and effective legal assistance, rather than the mere appointment of a lawyer.

Double Jeopardy

The double jeopardy or ne bis in idem principle fulfils various functions, particularly by providing finality for the defendant. Not having to fear subsequent prosecutions for the same crime eliminates the aspect of uncertainty for the defendant, and it can be argued that this fear of retrials in itself might constitute an unjust punishment. Subsequent prosecutions for the same offence also increase the probability of a person being convicted, resulting in defendants being in a weaker position in which the equality of arms is no longer upheld. This makes it increasingly difficult for the individual to gather the necessary resources and strength to fight their case again. Thus, the principles of finality and equality of arms are key parts of the rationale for the ne bis in idem principle. Without this protection in place, an individual can be tried again indefinitely, lacking a guarantee of justice and fairness. It can therefore be said that the ne bis in idem protection is ‘a consequence of the right to a fair trial’. This protection has also been established in the case law of the ECtHR. As the Court found in the case of Mihalache v Romania, ‘[t]he protection against duplication of criminal proceedings is one of the specific safeguards associated with the general guarantee of a fair hearing in criminal proceedings’.

Rights of the Defence and Examination of Witnesses

As stated above in the section on presumption of innocence, although a defendant is not required to prove their innocence, they have the right to call evidence in their own defence; even in these circumstances, the prosecuting authority bears the burden of proving the allegations. It is a right of the defence to have a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence against them. Article 14(3) ICCPR sets out these rights in explicit terms, and General Comment No. 32 provides detailed guidance on their scope: the right to adequate time and facilities encompasses the right to communicate with counsel in conditions of confidentiality, access to the prosecution’s evidence, and sufficient time to prepare a defence that is not merely formal but practically effective. The ECtHR has read equivalent guarantees into Article 6 ECHR through the principle of equality of arms and the overarching requirement of procedural fairness, while Articles 8(2)(c) and (f) ACHR address the right to preparation and the right to examine witnesses directly.

The right to examine witnesses, the confrontation right, requires a defendant to be able to challenge the evidence of witnesses against them. The ECtHR affirmed this in Lucà v Italy, finding that evidence must be produced at the public hearing, and not just at the pre-trial stage if it is to be used as the sole or decisive basis for conviction in order to be compatible with Article 6 ECHR.  However, there are some practical constraints to this approach, such as the unavailability of witnesses or a potential re-traumatisation for victims of sexual or domestic violence, that resulted in the Court moving away from its rigid ‘sole or decisive’ approach (Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom). This issue of the confrontation right alongside vulnerable witnesses has also been raised by the CEDAW Committee, which called for trauma-informed approaches to the examination of witnesses in sexual violence cases.

Adequacy and Sufficiency of Evidence

International human rights law generally treats the evaluation of evidence as a matter of domestic law and judicial discretion into which international bodies should not routinely intervene. The HRC has mostly held that it is generally for domestic courts, not the Committee, to evaluate the facts and evidence in a particular case. This can be explained by the international institution’s lack of fact-finding capacity, resulting in international human rights law generally offering limited protection in relation to the admission of evidence. However, the HRC did find a violation of Article 14 ICCPR in Gridin v Russia, where the domestic courts had failed to address the applicant’s challenges to the evidential basis of the conviction.

The ECtHR has adopted a similarly restrained approach to evidential sufficiency, but has developed jurisprudence on the procedural rules governing the admission of evidence that bears directly on the fairness of criminal proceedings.

Arrest, Detention, and Pre-Trial Procedure

Legal Authority and Use of Force

All human beings are guaranteed the right to liberty and security. This right is also extended to those who find themselves under arrest or in detention. Therefore, any arrest or detention must be lawful, as this would otherwise constitute a wrongful deprivation of a person’s freedom, which is incompatible with fundamental principles enshrined in e.g. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which protects ‘the rights to life, liberty and security of a person’. The right to liberty in relation to detention is further enshrined in a variety of international human rights documents, such as Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6 of the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, Article 7(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 8 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights. Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law’.

Individuals are further in need of protection from ill-treatment and use of force. International standards governing the use of force in arrest and detention are primarily derived from universal treaties protecting life, liberty, and humane treatment – most notably the ICCPR, which prohibits arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment (Articles 6, 7, 9, 10), and the Convention against Torture, which bars any coercive or violent treatment in custody, supplemented by the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) preventive monitoring system. Regionally, the ECHR (Articles 2, 3, 5), the ACHR (Articles 4, 5, 7), and the ACHPR (Articles 4–6) impose parallel requirements that any force used to effect arrest or maintain detention must be lawful, non-arbitrary, and strictly necessary and proportionate, while guaranteeing protection from torture and inhuman treatment. Although not treaties, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention are treated as authoritative guidance for interpreting these binding obligations. Together, these instruments require that force in arrest and pre-trial contexts is based on clear legal authority, used only when indispensable, proportionate to the threat, and subject to effective oversight and accountability.

Arbitrary Detention in the Criminal Justice System

As stated above, the right to liberty is not absolute and international human rights conventions allow certain restrictions when required for the functioning of the criminal justice system. This encompasses the state’s authority to carry out an initial arrest, the right to be informed of the basis for the arrest, the right to be brought to trial within a reasonable period or be released, and the protection from arbitrary detention in situations where the state cannot offer an adequate justification for its duration.

Article 9 ICCPR provides the universal framework, and the HRC General Comment No. 35 is an essential reference to distinguish between the lawfulness of detention and its arbitrariness. The Committee has interpreted this broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, and lack of proportionality as well as procedural irregularity. This is important as detentions that comply with domestic laws may still be arbitrary under Article 9 if they are disproportionate, unnecessary, or pursued for an improper purpose. The regional systems have developed parallel frameworks: Article 5 ECHR, Articles 7 and 8 ACHR, and Article 6 ACHPR each address the conditions under which deprivation of liberty is permissible.

Detention encompasses a number of different forms. Arrest and police custody represent the first option for arbitrary detention and are susceptible to abuse. The HRC has affirmed in General Comment No. 35 that the requirement of reasonable suspicion as a precondition for arrest is a minimum international standard, and that arrests motivated by discriminatory grounds, i.e. race, religion, political opinion, are arbitrary regardless of whether they comply with domestic procedural requirements. Pre-trial and remand detention generate the highest number of detentions, despite the Nelson Mandela Rules which ‘outline minimum prison conditions, provide guidance, and set clear benchmarks for prison staff on how to uphold safety, security and human dignity’ and the HRC’s General Comment No. 35 highlighting that pre-trial detention should only be used where it is necessary to prevent flight, interference with evidence, or reoffending, and subject to regular judicial review. In Ilijkov v Bulgaria, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(3) ECHR where domestic courts had applied a statutory presumption that detention was necessary in serious cases without conducting an individualised assessment of the risks involved. However, the Report on the Use of Pretrial Detention in the Americas (2013) by the IACHR found that 30-80% of the region’s prison population are pre-trial detainees. This is an improvement over the previous number from the late 1990s, where up to 93% of some states’ detainees were held without judgment.

A special category is incommunicado detention; the detention of an individual in isolation with no access to legal advice, family members or independent medical assistance. Incommunicado detention thus sits at the intersection of several of the rights examined in this chapter: it contains the prohibition on arbitrary detention, the right to legal assistance, the right to challenge detention, and the prohibition on torture and ill-treatment. The Inter-American system has engaged most extensively with incommunicado detention, partly because of its historical prevalence during the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, where it was a standard feature of enforced disappearance. In Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, discussed in detail below, incommunicado detention was identified as a critical element of the pattern of disappearance, stripping the detainee of all procedural protections. The IACtHR’s subsequent jurisprudence has addressed incommunicado detention directly in Bámaca Velásquez v Guatemala. Here, the Court found that the incommunicado detention constituted a violation of Articles 5, 7, and 8 ACHR, and affirmed that the right of access to legal counsel and the right to notify family members of detention cannot be suspended in situations of armed conflict or states of emergency. The ECtHR has also addressed incommunicado detention in cases such as Kurt v Turkey. In this case, the Court found a violation of Article 5 due to a failure to record the detention, to notify the family, and to bring the detainee before a judicial authority. In a similar case, Çiçek v Turkey, the Court also saw the failure of the State to provide an explanation for the fate of the detainees as a violation of Article 2 alongside Article 5 ECHR.

To address these issues relating to detention, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) receives individual communications, conducts country visits, and develops deliberations on categories of arbitrary detention. The WGAD has created a framework which identifies detention as arbitrary where it lacks any legal basis, where it results from the exercise of protected rights, where it violates fair trial standards, where it involves discrimination, or where it violates international law in the context of refugees and asylum seekers. This provides a more expansive definition of arbitrariness than most domestic legal systems apply, and has been used to find detention arbitrary in contexts ranging from prolonged remand to the detention of human rights defenders and journalists. The WGAD’s opinions are not legally binding, but they carry significant normative authority and are frequently cited in domestic and international litigation.

Investigation and Accountability for Allegations of Ill-Treatment

Additionally, there is an obligation to investigate allegations of ill-treatment, and the investigation must be appropriate. Any claims of ill-treatment must be investigated by the relevant competent authorities in a timely and impartial manner. This has been confirmed in Sahli v Algeria, reaffirming that authorities are required to take all necessary measures to ensure that cases of ill-treatment are investigated. This also reinforces the understanding that waivers of prosecution cannot apply to torture. Further, the investigation into the alleged abuse must be adequate. In Zyuskin v Russia (2011), the HRC reaffirmed that the burden of proof in relation to alleged ill-treatment cannot solely lie with the applicant, rather that the state not only has an obligation to investigate the claims of ill-treatment, but that the investigations by domestic authorities also need to produce evidence and address the claims made in relation to the allegations.

The Right of Access to Counsel

As one of the fair trial rights, access to legal counsel is essential for those in detention to act as a safeguard during the detention and pre-trial processes. Section 20(c) of the Robben Island Guidelines by the African Commission, which assist States to meet their national, regional and international obligations for the promotion of human rights and in the prevention of torture and ill-treatment in Africa, states that state parties shall ensure that ‘all persons who are deprived of their liberty by public order or authority should have that detention controlled by properly and legally constituted regulations. Such regulations should provide a number of basic safeguards, all of which shall apply from the moment when they are first deprived of their liberty. These include: […] c) The right of access to a lawyer’. As held by the ACHPR in Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights v Egypt (2011), this is particularly required at all stages of the proceedings where the defendant may face capital punishment. Additionally, the counsel must be effective and therefore more than pro forma.

Sentencing and the Right to Appeal

Capital Sentences under Human Rights Standards

International human rights law establishes strict limitations on the use of capital punishment and promotes its abolition. Although the death penalty has not been universally prohibited, global and regional human rights instruments impose high thresholds and significant procedural safeguards. Article 6 enshrines the inherent and non-derogable right to life. While the ICCPR does not prohibit the death penalty outright, it strictly confines its use:

• It may be imposed only for the ‘most serious crimes’, generally understood to mean intentional killing.
• It must follow a final judgment by a competent court.
• Persons facing the death penalty must receive full Article 14 fair trial guarantees.
• Its application must not be arbitrary or discriminatory.

Importantly, Article 6(6) specifies that the Covenant should not delay or prevent abolition, confirming an overarching abolitionist direction. This is further supported by the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (1989) which represents the strongest international commitment to abolition. States parties must: abolish the death penalty in all circumstances; prohibit executions; and take legislative and administrative measures to secure abolition. Only a narrow wartime exception is permitted for some states with reservations. International bodies have interpreted human rights protections to extend beyond direct execution to include indirect involvement, such as extraditing a person to a country where they may face capital punishment under conditions violating human rights standards.

There are currently no cases in which international human rights bodies have deemed a method of execution in line with human rights standards. This is due to the requirement set out by the Human Rights Committee that the implementation of the death penalty must be carried out in a manner causing ‘the least possible physical and mental suffering’, a standard that no execution methods can meet. The above discussion shows that the legitimacy of the death penalty is increasingly incompatible with human rights standards.

Non-Capital Sentences under Human Rights Standards

Though arguably less severe, there is also a need to ensure that non-capital sentences comply with human rights standards. Thinking back to the issues surrounding detention and the right to liberty discussed earlier in this chapter, serious human rights violations can occur on various levels. International human rights law recognises that even when a state does not impose the death penalty, the administration of non-capital sentences, including imprisonment, fines, or other punitive measures, must comply with fundamental human rights standards. The underlying principle is that all forms of punishment must respect human dignity, legality, proportionality, and fairness.

The ICCPR provides the primary universal standards for non-capital sentences. Article 9 ICCPR protects against arbitrary arrest and detention, requiring that any deprivation of liberty be lawful and subject to judicial oversight. Article 10(1) ICCPR emphasises that all persons deprived of liberty must be treated with humanity and respect for inherent dignity. This is further reinforced in the regional human rights systems, such as Article 3 ECHR, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment, and Article 5(2) ACHR, which guarantees personal liberty and humane treatment for detainees.

Non-capital sentences must also adhere to the principle of legality. Article 15 ICCPR and Article 7 ECHR ensure that penalties are prescribed by law, non-retroactive, and sufficiently precise to allow individuals to foresee the consequences of their actions. The ACHR protects these rights under Articles 8, 9, and 24. The ECtHR has applied this principle in cases involving fines or lengthy prison terms, emphasising that the punishment must be proportionate to the offence (Taranenko v Russia, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece in broader detention contexts). Human rights law imposes a proportionality requirement on non-capital sentences. The punishment must correspond with the gravity of the offence, and states are obliged to avoid excessive or arbitrary sanctions. For example, the ECtHR in Vinter and Others v United Kingdom stressed that life imprisonment without the possibility of review may violate Article 3 ECHR. This demonstrates that even non-capital penalties must retain avenues for review and potential release. The Inter-American Court has similarly emphasised proportionality in non-capital sentencing, particularly in cases where prison conditions exacerbate the punitive impact. In Suárez Rosero v Ecuador, the IACtHR found a violation of Article 7(2) and (3) ACHR ‘due to the facilities [being] unsuitable for persons in preventive detention’. Similarly, the ECtHR found that overcrowding and unsanitary conditions in prisons violated Article 3 of the ECHR, even though the sentence itself was lawful (Kalashnikov v Russia). This shows that human rights standards extend beyond the legal imposition of a sentence to its execution and the conditions under which it is carried out.

Special consideration needs to be given to groups that require additional protections in non-capital sentencing. Under Article 37 Convention on the Rights of the Child, children must be detained only as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period, and must be separated from adults. Persons with disabilities, as recognised in Article 14 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, must have access to accommodations ensuring procedural fairness and humane treatment during detention.

International human rights law also requires judicial oversight and the possibility of review of non-capital sentences. Article 14 ICCPR guarantees the right to appeal and challenges to sentences, while regional courts emphasise periodic review of long-term or indeterminate imprisonment to ensure ongoing compliance with proportionality and humane treatment standards.

The Right to Appeal and the Scope of Appellate Review

The right to appeal a criminal conviction constitutes a fundamental safeguard within international human rights law. It ensures that errors at trial can be corrected, protects against miscarriages of justice, and reinforces public confidence in the administration of justice. Although various human rights instruments articulate this right in different ways, a common principle emerges: individuals convicted of a crime must have access to a meaningful review of their conviction and/or sentence by a higher tribunal.

Article 14(5) ICCPR establishes a clear and broad guarantee: ‘Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law’.

This requires the mandatory availability of an appellate review mechanism for criminal convictions. This does not just extend to mere procedural issues, but also a review of conviction and sentencing. This process must be substantive, which requires the appellate body to be competent to evaluate questions of evidence, legal interpretations, and procedural issues, in that the trial must be fair. Any limitations on the appeal process must not affect its practical effectiveness, whether this relates to, for example, admissibility requirements or time restraints. If a review focuses only on points of law in the sense of a judicial or cassation review, this may be insufficient unless it allows genuine scrutiny of the correctness of the conviction.

The ECtHR guarantees the right to appeal through Protocol No. 7, Article 2, which provides:

This is broadly aligned with the ICCPR but contains two notable points. Firstly, exceptions are permitted if, for example, the person was tried in the first instance by the highest court or where minor offences carry only small penalties. Secondly, the appellate review must be genuine and effective, regardless of whether the state structures its review as an appeal on law, an appeal on fact, or a mixed model.

The ACHR provides one of the strongest appellate rights among regional systems. Article 8(2)(h) states:

In the Inter-American approach, the right to appeal is absolute in criminal matters, with no equivalent exceptions to those found in the ECHR. The IACtHR has further stressed that the appellate review must be full and effective, which includes reconsideration of the factual basis of the conviction and the proportionality of the sentence. In order to achieve this, states must structure their judicial systems so that every person has a genuine opportunity to challenge errors in proceedings, regardless of procedural technicalities. This shows the Inter-American system’s strong emphasis on substantive review and positions it as the stronger protector of the appellate review, particularly when compared to the African system.

Although the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not expressly mention a right to appeal, the African Commission and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights have interpreted Article 7 to include a right to review a criminal conviction. The African Commission has held that individuals must be afforded the possibility to appeal to a higher tribunal, particularly in criminal cases. The guarantees provided in Article 7 must also extend to all stages of the proceedings, including the appellate review. Recent case law from the African Court has strengthened this interpretation, affirming that appellate review must be meaningful, not merely formal, and must allow reconsideration of the lawfulness of conviction and sentence. In Mgosi Mwita Makungu v Tanzania, the Court elaborated on the meaning of the right to appeal under Article 7(1)(a) ACHPR. It held that it requires ‘that individuals are provided with an opportunity to access competent organs, to appeal decisions or acts violating their rights’ and that the state ‘facilitates the exercise of this right by individuals, by providing them with the judgments or decisions that they wish to appeal from’. 

Discrimination and Vulnerable Groups

Freedom from discrimination is one of the foundational commitments of international human rights law. Yet violations of this right are prominent in the criminal justice system across every region of the world. Racial minorities, women, indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, and children are systemically disadvantaged when seeking redress as victims, and are also disproportionately represented among those who find themselves within the criminal justice system. This section examines how international human rights law protects freedom from discrimination and vulnerability in the criminal justice system and explores whether a framework built around the vindication of individual rights is structurally equipped to address forms of disadvantage that are collective, systemic and deeply embedded within the world it operates in.

The Non-Discrimination Framework

Freedom from discrimination in the criminal justice system operates at multiple levels of international law. Universally, Articles 2 and 26 ICCPR provide a comprehensive non-discrimination guarantee and General Comment No. 18 (1989) clarified the distinction between formal and substantive equality, which opens the door for states to address structural disadvantages through positive obligations. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) sharpens this framework in the context of criminal justice. Article 5 ICERD specifically guarantees the right to equal treatment before courts and all other organs administering justice. In addition, the Committee on Racial Discrimination (CERD) developed this obligation considerably in their General Recommendation No. 31 (2005) on the prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning in the criminal justice system. General Recommendation No. 31 identifies the risk of racial profiling in policing, the disproportionate application of pre-trial detention to racial minorities, discrepancies in sentencing, and the barriers faced by minority victims in accessing justice. Through this Recommendation, states are addressed directly and called to, inter alia, collect comprehensive statistical data on complaints, prosecutions and convictions, harsher sentencing, and insufficient representation within the criminal justice system of persons belonging to racial or ethnic groups.

Non-discrimination frameworks have also been developed within regional human rights systems. Though structurally limited, Article 14 ECHR prohibits discrimination and it can be invoked alongside another Convention right. Relating to criminal justice, Article 14 has been read in conjunction with Article 5 in Spišák v the Czech Republic where a juvenile detainee was subjected to different rules on periodic review of pre-trial detention compared to an adult person prosecuted for the same category of offence. The ECtHR also found discrimination in access to justice under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6 in the case of Moldovan and Others v Romania (no. 2), brought by Roma villagers whose ethnicity was decisive for the length and result of domestic proceedings which included discriminatory remarks.

Article 1(1) ACHR imposes a general non-discrimination obligation across all Convention rights offering a more robust approach. In addition, the Inter-American Court and Commission have developed a substantial body of case law on discrimination in the criminal justice system, particularly in relation to indigenous peoples and women. In the case of Rosendo Cantú v Mexico , the IACtHR found a violation of the right to a fair trial and judicial protection in relation to Article 1(1) ACHR and a violation of Mexico’s obligation to guarantee, without discrimination, the right to access to justice. The Inter-American system also addressed the discriminatory lack of access to justice in Brazil in Maria da Penha v Brazil, a landmark case regarding discriminatory treatment with respect to domestic violence against women.

In the African system, Article 2 ACHPR prohibits discrimination and Article 3 guarantees equality before the law, forming the anti-discrimination and equal protection provisions of the African Charter. The African Commission in Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, found, inter alia, a violation of Articles 2 and 3 by Gambia as its Lunatic Detention Act was discriminatory against people with mental disabilities and lacked provisions for the review, appeal against, and remedy of erroneous detention.

Race and the Criminal Justice System

International law has struggled to visibly respond to race disparities in the criminal justice system, yet they are among the most extensively documented human rights problems. The UN International Independent Expert Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice and Equality in Law Enforcement concluded in its 2025 report that systemic racism against Africans and people of African descent is pervasive and deeply entrenched in criminal justice systems around the world. The Expert Mechanism’s report identified twelve key elements needed for the elimination of racism and discrimination, including the elimination of racial profiling and a diverse and fair representation across the justice chain.

The ECtHR has dealt with ‘institutionalised racism’ in cases such as Lingurar v Romania, and referred to the discriminatory police action against the Roma applicants as ‘ethnic profiling’, constituting a violation of Articles 3 and 14 ECHR.

The issue of structural racial discrimination, which results in disparate outcomes through facially neutral rules rather than explicit discriminatory intent, proves difficult given the individual approach of human rights institutions. The dominant model in international human rights law prohibits treating like cases differently, but struggles to require treating different cases differently to achieve substantively equal outcomes, as Sandra Fredman argues. The limitation becomes clear when faced with issues like mass racialised incarceration, which results from the cumulative effect of under-representation in legal services and harsher sentencing practices, rather than a single discriminatory decision. As a result, there is scope for the law to develop. Whilst the ICERD provisions call on states to recognise and address systemic racism, this has not resulted in sufficient legal and political outcomes to break down racial and ethnic hierarchies.

It is open to question, then, whether IHRL can address structural discrimination? The instruments and cases examined in this section share a common theme in that they identify specific acts or failures of the criminal justice system, attribute responsibility to a state, and require that individual applicants are afforded remedies. This has resulted in justice, but only through an individualised approach. It is therefore important to question whether this approach is adequate to the scale of the problem. Abolitionist feminist scholars like Silvana Tapia Tapia  and Natasa Mavronicola argue that racialised and gendered mass incarceration is a feature of the criminal justice system, rather than a failure of the system. It acts as a mechanism of social control for which international human rights law is structurally ill-equipped to challenge and would require a fundamental reimagination of its institutions. The individualised approach of rights litigation is, however, not the only tool available. Engagement with treaty monitoring bodies alongside reparations with guarantees of non-repetition and structural injunctions can lead to systemic change. The centring of societal reparations through the contributions of the Durban Declaration, as well as the IACtHR’s approach to reparations (see below) shows that there is an awareness of the need to change.

Women in the Criminal Justice System

The system of IHRL increasingly addresses women: (1) as defendants and prisoners, and (2) as victims. Both of these aspects bring their own challenges, as women often face inappropriate treatment to their specific needs when incarcerated and difficulties associated with proceedings for victims of gender-based and sexual violence.

The international standard for women in detention is set out in the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok Rules). These support and complement the 1955 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the UN Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures, and the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) and recognise the specific needs of women prisoners, related to, for example, pregnancy, childcare, and experience of gender-based violence. It has been noted that the Bangkok Rules adopt a cis-normative stance and therefore exclude transwomen. The Bangkok Rules are not directly enforceable, but rather act as a soft law tool and therefore rely on states to acknowledge them domestically and regional instruments to refer to them.

A legally binding instrument at the international level is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which imposes obligations on state parties that span the criminal justice system. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 33 (2015) on women’s access to justice identifies structural, procedural, and institutional barriers that prevent women from accessing legal remedies. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 35 (2017) on gender-based violence against women provides comprehensive guidance that requires states to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish gender-based violence of both state and non-state actors.

One of the landmark cases addressing gender discrimination and criminal justice failure before the ECtHR is Opuz v Turkey. Here, the Court found a violation of Articles 2, 3, and 14 ECHR and held that the discriminatory impact of the criminal justice system’s failure to act could be established by statistical evidence showing that domestic violence disproportionately affected women, without requiring proof of discriminatory intent. The focus away from intent is an important development by the ECtHR, yet one that requires structural domestic reforms that states need to be willing and able to provide.

The IACHR has addressed similar cases in Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v USA where the Commission recognised gender-based violence as one of the ‘most extreme and pervasive forms of discrimination, severely impairing and nullifying the enforcement of women’s rights’.

Persons with Disabilities

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) changed the approach of international human rights law to disability from a welfare or medical model to a societal model (see discussion in UN Chapter). This change has important implications for the criminal justice system for persons with disabilities who are suspects, defendants, or perceived as dangerous or incapacitated. Article 14 CRPD prohibits the deprivation of liberty on the basis of disability and entitles those deprived of their liberty to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law on an equal basis with others. The African Commission addressed the detention of persons with disabilities in Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, finding that the detention under the Lunatics Detention Act, a colonial-era statute without procedural safeguards and no right to challenge detention, violated the prohibition of discrimination, degrading treatment, and the right to liberty. This is a significant decision as it extends the protections of the ACHPR to a marginalised group who lacked procedural protection in the criminal justice system and highlights the particular vulnerability of persons with psychosocial disabilities to detention regimes that exist outside the regular justice system, and therefore outside the standard monitoring frameworks.

Juveniles

Articles 37 and 40 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) govern the treatment of children and young persons in the criminal justice system, alongside the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules) and the UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (Havana Rules). The CRC Committee’s General Comment No. 10 (2007) emphasises rehabilitation and reintegration as the primary objectives of juvenile justice, encouraging diversion from formal criminal proceedings where possible, and prohibiting life imprisonment without parole for offences committed by persons below the age of 18. In its Advisory Opinion OC-17/02 on the Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, the IACtHR stated that the primary consideration in criminal justice proceedings must be the best interest of the child, and that this requires heightened procedural protection.

Victims’ Rights under International Human Rights Law

International human rights law increasingly recognises that victims of crimes, human rights violations, and state abuses have distinct rights and protections. These rights complement those of accused persons, ensuring that victims are treated with dignity, have access to justice, and can participate meaningfully in legal processes. Whilst the definition of the term victim is not universal to all international bodies, it generally describes a person who has ‘suffered injury or loss as a result of an illegal act’ (victim), either against themselves or against others (indirect victim, often family members).

Victims’ rights are reflected in both universal and regional human rights instruments. At the universal level, the ICCPR indirectly guarantees victims’ rights through provisions on access to justice in Articles 2 and 14 and effective remedies in Article 2(3). The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985, UNGA Res. 40/34) specifically articulates victims’ rights to access to justice, restitution, and compensation. Further, the Convention against Torture (CAT) also provides victims of torture with the right to make a complaint and obtain reparation in Articles 12-14.

Regionally, the ECtHR, IACtHR, and ACtHPR provide access to those who claim to have had their human rights violated. The specifics differ in each of the systems, with the ACthHPR allows victim participation by NGOs and individuals who are not victims can petition to the Commission in line with Article 55 ACHPR. This is justified by the African Commission’s approach to collective rights as justiciable rights (Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria). At the IACtHR, either victims or potential victims can petition to the IACommHR according to Article 44 IACHR (Morales de Sierra v Guatemala). In comparison, at the ECtHR, victims can bring an individual application directly to the Court (Article 34 ECHR).

Reflecting the right to access justice and remedies, victims must be able to bring complaints, lodge civil claims, and participate in criminal proceedings. The IACtHR has emphasised that states have a duty to provide effective judicial avenues for victims to seek redress (see below Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras).

The participation of victims in proceedings is another important right protected through treaties and supported through international jurisprudence. This allows victims the right to be heard, receive information about case progress, and participate in sentencing or reparations. Regional courts increasingly recognise victims’ procedural rights in both criminal and human rights cases.

In addition to the right to participate, victims are also entitled to restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction. This right is codified in Article 2(3) ICCPR and reinforced by the UN General Assembly Resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. The right to reparation is further established in the jurisprudence of human rights courts, including the Inter-American Court’s decisions in Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras.

In summary, it is imperative that victims can seek justice through international bodies such as the ICC, alongside regional human rights courts (ECtHR, IACtHR, ACHPR) and UN treaty bodies (Human Rights Committee, CAT Committee), as well as through domestic courts. The significance of these international avenues for victims lies not just in their ability to mandate reparations but also in the opportunities they provide for systemic reforms.