Introduction

The relationship between human rights and the environment has emerged as one of the most significant legal developments of the 21st century. While the connection was first established in the early 70s, it is only in recent years that there has been a notable increase in the recognition of this link across jurisdictions worldwide. How did this happen? According to the Western traditional perspective, human rights law does not address environmental issues – environmental law is a distinct subject area with its own legal framework and institutions – and yet, almost all human rights bodies now recognize that environmental degradation can cause severe human rights violations.

The foundational premise underlying this relationship rests on the recognition of the indissoluble interrelation between human beings and nature. In the face of the unprecedented challenges posed by the triple planetary crisis of climate change, pollution and loss of biodiversity, the acknowledgement that only a healthy planet can sustain life has become central. Science shows that such challenges put at risk people’s lives and livelihoods which are at the core of human rights protection. Consequently, environmental protection is recognized as a prerequisite for the realization of human rights, with profound implications for the human rights framework.

This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of the relationship between human rights and the environment. It does so by illustrating (1) the major legal developments in this field, from its early foundations to contemporary climate litigation and (2) the main substantive and procedural rights affected by environmental degradation, including the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, (3) by exploring justice concerns raised by environmental and climate risks and finally (4) by addressing emerging issues, in particular human rights and business and the rights of nature.

The relationship between Human Rights and the Environment

From early declarations to climate negotiations

The recognition of the interrelationship between human rights and environmental protection has developed through various phases. This evolution began with early international declarations, progressed through climate change negotiations, advanced via regional human rights jurisprudence, and ultimately culminated in contemporary climate litigation. The United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment, adopting the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, marked a significant milestone in the legal acknowledgment of the connection between human rights and environmental protection. The first principle of the Stockholm Declaration emphasizes that:

This principle provided the conceptual framework for linking a healthy environment to human dignity and well-being, establishing environmental protection as a precondition for the enjoyment of the full spectrum of human rights.

In the 1980s, the UN acknowledged the critical need to reconcile economic development and well-being with environmental protection. This led to the 1992 Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, resulting in the adoption of Agenda 21, the first comprehensive global blueprint for sustainable development. Additionally, the Rio Declaration emphasised the intrinsic connection between human rights and the environment. Notably, Principle 10 highlighted the importance of procedural rights—such as public access to environmental information, participation in decision-making, and access to justice—as fundamental human rights essential for effective environmental protection. This principle recognised that environmental issues affect individuals’ lives and therefore necessitate inclusive participation and transparency, anchoring environmental governance within a human rights framework. The latter are now enshrined in relevant treaties such as the Aarhus Convention and the Escazú Agreement, as it will be explained later in this Chapter.

Another major outcome of the 1992 Earth Summit was the Convention on Biological Diversity. This treaty underscores the importance of healthy ecosystems for both current and future generations, as economic and social development is inherently linked to them. Consequently, the Convention aims to conserve biological diversity, promote sustainable and equitable access to natural resources, and ensure the fair sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources, thereby safeguarding the human rights of present and future generations.

The 1992 Earth Summit also brought about the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), laying the foundation for global climate action and subsequent climate negotiations. Initially centred on technical objectives such as greenhouse gas stabilisation, climate negotiations the negotiations progressively acknowledged the profound social dimensions of climate change. The Kyoto Protocol mandated legally binding emissions reductions but did not explicitly address human rights. The first formal acknowledgment of human rights obligations within the UNFCCC framework occurred at the 2010 Cancun Conference of the Parties, where parties adopted a decision affirming that “Parties should, in all climate change related actions, fully respect human rights.” This momentum culminated in the 2015 Paris Agreement, which marked a pivotal development in linking climate action directly with human rights. It, indeed, acknowledged that climate change is a:

While the language could have been more ambitious and was situated in the preamble rather than operative provisions, the 2015 Paris Agreement positioned human rights as a relevant component of sustainable climate solutions. This led to the progressive incorporation of human rights language in the decisions adopted  in subsequent climate negotiations referencing all three pillars of climate action: mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage.

The 2012 Rio+20 Conference, which initiated a process to develop a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aimed at integrating environmental sustainability with social inclusion and equity, further prompted the recognition of the interlinkages between human rights and environmental protection. The adopted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development anchors SDGs within a framework ‘determined to protect the planet from degradation’ while ensuring sustainable resource management and urgent climate action, ‘so that it can support the needs of the present and future generations’.

The evolution of this relationship has continued within the framework of the United Nations. Alongside the growing recognition of the nexus between environmental degradation and human rights violations, further supported by scientific evidence, UN human rights bodies have increasingly issued authoritative documents on this matter. The latter not only illustrate the major impacts of the triple planetary crisis on human health, livelihoods, and rights but also outline a human rights-based approach to sustainable actions. As such they have played a crucial role in promoting the integration of environmental and climate considerations within the human rights regime and conversely, the incorporation of human-rights based approaches within environmental and climate frameworks. Additionally, the appointment of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment and the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change has also been vital in this context.

Regional developments

The convergence of human rights and environmental protection has been most pronounced at the regional level, where legal systems have played a crucial role in interpreting and expanding human rights law to address environmental concerns. As noted in the chapter on the Core Principles of Internatonal Human Rights Law,  human rights are recognised as universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. This comprehensive approach created the environment in which human rights bodies were able to acknowledge the significant influence of environmental factors on the enjoyment and exercise of human rights. Among them, the European, Inter-American and African regional systems (see the chapter on Regional Systems of International Human Rights Protections) have emerged as leaders in developing robust jurisprudence on this subject, despite their differing contexts, histories, and legal traditions. While additional regional initiatives exist outside these three primary systems, they remain less developed. Both the Arab Charter on Human Rights and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration mention environmental protection; however, neither  has yet generated a comparable body of case law or institutional practice.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has played a pivotal role in integrating environmental protection with human rights in Europe, particularly through the notion of positive obligations. Despite the absence of an explicit right to a healthy environment, the Court has employed its “living instrument doctrine,” to broaden the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in response to environmental challenges. This greening began in the early 1990s, with landmark judgments such as Powell v. United Kingdom and Fredin v. Sweden, in which the Court explicitly recognized that environmental protection is ‘an increasingly important consideration in modern society’. In particular, since López Ostra v. Spain, which concerned toxic emission from a waste treatment plant, the Court has firmly linked environmental degradation with violations of the right to life (Article 2) and of the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8).

Subsequent rulings have further broadened the application of these provisions to various scenarios, from industrial pollution and dangerous industrial activities (e.g. Kolyadenko and Others v Russia, Öneryildiz v Turkey, Brincat and Others v Malta and Pavlov and Others v Russia), including large-scale pollution (Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy) to water supply contamination (e.g. Solyanik v Russia), nuclear radiation (e.g. LCB v the United Kingdom) and natural disasters (e.g. Budayeva and Others v Russia and Özel and others v Turkey). In these cases, underscoring that severe environmental degradation can significantly impact individuals’ well-being, hinder their enjoyment of their homes, and pose serious risks to their health and lives, the ECtHR has increasingly affirmed that States are required to take all appropriate steps and measure to prevent and remedy to environmental threats. The Court has also acknowledged the significance of procedural rights, such as fair trial and access to justice (Article 6), access to information (Article 10) and remedy (Article 13) in environmental matters (e.g. Fredin v. Sweden, Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France and Stichting Landgoed Steenbergen and Others v. the Netherlands).

The Inter-American human rights system has developed a parallel jurisprudence on environmental issues, particularly through the acknowledgement that the collective rights of indigenous people over their ancestral lands are intrinsically linked to environmental stewardship (see the chapter on Regional Systems of International Human Rights Protections). In the landmark case Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) became the first to affirm indigenous collective property rights, thereby laying the groundwork for enhanced environmental protections. This foundation was further reinforced in Saramaka People v. Suriname, where the IACtHR broadened procedural rights by advancing the principle of free, prior, and informed consent for indigenous communities – a principle that was reaffirmed in Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. These rulings underscore the importance of genuine consultation and participation when state or corporate actions may affect indigenous territories and natural resources.

A significant turning point occurred with Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 in which the IACtHR affirmed the ‘undeniable relationship between the protection of the environment and the realisation of other human rights’ and recognized an ‘autonomous’ and justiciable right to a healthy environment under Article 26 (right to progressive development) of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). According to the Court, this right safeguards environmental components – such as forests, rivers, and seas – as legal interests in themselves, even without proof of direct harm to individuals (paras 62-63). This Advisory Opinion strongly influenced subsequent rulings. In Lhaka Honhat Association v. Argentina, the Court found, for the first time in a contentious case, a violation of the autonomous right to a healthy environment alongside rights to indigenous community property, cultural identity, food, and water due to state-sanctioned environmental degradation. The judgment confirmed the direct justifiability of these rights, requiring not only land restitution but also comprehensive reparations, including environmental restoration. Similarly, in La Oroya Population v Perù, finding Peru in violation of Oroya residents’ rights to a healthy environment, health, life, and personal integrity because of severe air, water, and soil contamination, the IACtHR ordered the state to provide medical care and compensation to victims. Through its jurisprudence, the Court has emphasized that environmental degradation is not merely an ecological issue; it poses a direct threat to individual and collective rights, particularly for indigenous peoples whose cultural and material survival depends on their natural environment (see the chapter on Regional Systems of International Human Rights Protections).

In contrast to the European and Inter-American human rights systems, the African human rights framework is distinguished by its explicit recognition of collective rights relating to environmental protection, as outlined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Notably, Article 24 asserts that ‘all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development’, while Article 21 guarantees all peoples ‘the right to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resource’. These provisions have been invoked to establish states obligations, especially, to “prevent pollution and ecological degradation” in relation to extractive industries. In the landmark case of SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria – commonly referred to as the Ogoniland case – the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACommHPR), found Nigeria in violation of such provisions, as well as socio-economic rights, due to its failure to prevent and remedy severe environmental degradation resulting from oil extraction, which adversely affected health, livelihoods, and cultural survival of Ogoni people. Similarly, in African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Kenya, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), held Kenya in breach of Article 21, alongside violations of property and development rights, for forcibly evicting the Ogiek people from the Mau Forest under the pretext of environmental conservation, and for excluding them from decision-making regarding their ancestral lands. Together, these three human rights systems have established substantive and procedural obligations to prevent environmental harm, promote conservation, and enable public participation, thereby laying the foundation for addressing climate change within a human rights framework.

Human Rights-based climate litigation

Climate change offered further room to solidify the connection between human rights and the protection of the environment, recognizing that the increasing frequency and intensity of climate events puts the life, health and livelihoods of people at serious risk. This has given rise to a distinctive wave of climate litigation known as human rights-based climate litigation. Climate litigation is defined as cases that raise “material issues of law or fact about climate change mitigation, adaptation, or the science of climate change.” Such cases can be brought before a range of administrative, judicial and other adjudicatory bodies. In human rights-based climate litigation, applicants invoke human rights law as legal ground and urge relevant courts to consider the human rights implications and accountability concerning states’ failure to adequately and promptly address climate change.

While the international community began to establish a connection between human rights and climate change in the early 90s through climate treaties, the first litigation of this kind can be traced to the Inuit petition submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR) in 2005 which highlighted the disproportionate impacts of global warming on indigenous communities. However, it is only in recent decades – bolstered by increasingly compelling scientific evidence, UN resolutions and reports including UN experts’ statements and mounting climate activism – that there has been an upsurge of such litigation globally. In particular, landmark developments can be found at regional and UN levels.

The European, Inter-American, and African human rights courts, with their established environmental jurisprudence, have provided robust grounds for human rights-based climate litigation. Since the Urgenda case which initiated this wave of litigation at national level in Europe, the ECtHR has been invested of several cases relating to climate change, culminating in its first decision in this arena in 2024. In KlimaSeniorinnen v Switzerland, a case involving a group of elderly women alleging human rights violations due to heatwaves, the Court has recognized that climate change ‘”is one of the most pressing issues of our times” (para 410) and a “common concern of mankind” (para 451). Given its detrimental effects and the principle of intergenerational burden-sharing (para 489), the ECtHR concluded that “by failing to act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner regarding the devising, development and implementation of the relevant legislative and administrative framework, [Switzerland] failed to comply with its positive obligations” under Article 8 of the ECHR entailing a right for individuals to effective protection from the serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being, and quality of life (para 544-548). The decision, regarded as historic and unprecedented, marked the first ruling on climate change by a regional human right body.

In 2025, based on a request formulated by Chile and Colombia, the IACtHR issued an advisory opinion on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights. In OC-32/35, the Court acknowledged that the current situation constitutes a climate emergency and established that states have obligations to act in accordance with a standard of ‘”enhanced due diligence” in preventing climate change and protecting people from its effects (para 422). In doing so, the Court recognized the existence of “the right to a healthy climate, understood as a component of the right to a healthy environment” as well as nature and its components as subjects of rights, on the basis of the full understanding of the interdependence between humans and nature and the need to free the climate system from anthropogenic interferences that endanger it (para 388). In contrast, the African human rights system has demonstrated, to date, a limited engagement with climate change. However, in response to the growing transnational developments in this area, the Pan African Lawyers Union, in collaboration with the African Climate Platform, the Environmental Lawyers Collective for Africa, Natural Justice, and resilient40, submitted a request to ACtHPR in May 2025 for an advisory opinion on States’ obligations regarding climate change. The forthcoming advisory opinion presents an opportunity for the ACtHPR to align to the current trend of human rights-based climate litigation while developing its own jurisprudence on the basis of ACHPR’s distinctive framing (see above).

At the UN level, significant developments have occurred in the field, beginning with General Comment (GC) No. 36 on the right to life (Article 6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ Human Rights Committee (HRC). GC No.36 includes specific paragraphs addressing the relationship between human rights and the environment. Notably, paragraph 26 emphasizes that the duty to protect life encompasses the obligation to address societal conditions that pose threats to life or hinder individuals from enjoying their right to life with dignity, including degradation of the environment. Furthermore, paragraph 62 asserts that “environmental degradation, climate change and unsustainable development constitute some of the most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and future generations to enjoy the right to life.” Crucially, GC No.36 establishes that states’ obligations under international environmental law should inform interpretation of Article 6, while obligations to respect and ensure the right to life should inform environmental law obligations.

In Teitiota v. New Zealand, by drawing from GC No. 36, the HRC acknowledged that the impacts of climate change may ‘[trigger] non-refoulement obligations of the sending state’ under Articles 6 and 7 of the [ICCPR] (see Chapter 10). This view has facilitated the filing of similar cases before UN human rights bodies. In Daniel Billy and others v. Australia (Torres Strait Islanders Petition), which involved a complaint from eight indigenous Torres Strait Islanders, whose communities on low-lying islands are facing existential threats from climate change, the HRC found that Australia had violated Islanders’ rights to family life, home, privacy, and to enjoy their culture (Articles 17 and 27 of the ICCPR) by failing to implement adequate adaptation and mitigation measures to protect against climate-induced harm such as flooding, coastal erosion, and rising sea temperatures (see Luporini for further details). In Sacchi et al v. Argentina et al., although the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) rejected the case on admissibility grounds, it found that States’ carbon emissions significantly contributed to the adverse effects of climate change, which are not confined within national borders and disproportionately impact children. As a result, it stated that states have heightened obligations to protect children from such foreseeable harms (see Nolan for further details). This position was further reinforced in GC No. 26, which confirmed that environmental protection is integral to the realization of children’s rights.

These developments, alongside the UN General Assembly’s resolution recognizing the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment (see section below), have culminated in the request for an advisory opinion before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change. In previous cases, the UN concluded that ‘the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn’ (e.g. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and Gabčíkovo-Nagymaris). Drawing on this case-law, the ICJ in Advisory Opinion 187/25, has affirmed that climate change is “an existential problem of planetary proportions” that, “impairs the enjoyment of a range of rights protected by human rights law.” Specifically, the Court stated that:

Hence, the full enjoyment of human rights cannot be ensured without safeguarding the environment from degradation. States have obligations under international human rights law to take all the necessary steps to protect the environment. This conclusion has been praised by UN Experts, as it acknowledges the intimate interconnection between the health of the planet and human beings, underscoring the importance of a human rights-based approach to this issue.

Together, the developments outlined in these sections reflect a clear trajectory: the relationship between human rights and environmental degradation has moved from aspirational declarations to legally binding and justiciable obligations. In this context, human rights bodies at both regional and international level, by interpreting human rights provisions in light of international environmental and climate law, through systemic integration (in the worlds of the ICJ’s Advisory opinion 187/25, these bodies of law ‘inform each other’ (para 404)), have identified the substantive and procedural rights affected by environmental degradation. Furthermore, relying on scientific evidence as a benchmark for the adequacy and effectiveness of climate actions, these bodies have clarified the relevant human rights positive obligations of states in this context.

Human Rights affected by environmental degradation

Environmental degradation threatens both substantive rights—those that safeguard fundamental interests such as life, health, and property – and procedural rights – those that ensure fair processes in environmental decision-making. The acknowledgment of these compromised rights has developed through jurisprudence across human rights systems, creating comprehensive frameworks for environmental protection within the context of human rights law. This section offers an overview of the main substantive and procedural rights impacted by environmental degradation, with a focus on the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment.

Substantive rights

The rights to life and personal integrity, health, and an adequate standard of living, as well as the right to private and family life, have emerged as fundamental rights increasingly threatened by environmental degradation. GC No 36 recognizes that climate change, pollution, and the depletion of natural resources constitute systemic threats to the survival of present and future generations. This interpretation has broadened the concept of life from mere physical existence to encompass “life with dignity” requiring States to prevent general societal conditions that may jeopardize human well-being, including environmental degradation. Similarly, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) (see GC No 14 and 15) and UN experts’ reports (e.g. Boyd, OHCHR) have reiterated that the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (Article 12 of CESCR) and the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 11 of CESCR) necessarily includes the guarantee of a safe environment with unpolluted air, water, and food and free from dangerous anthropogenic interferences.

These principles have been applied in landmark cases. In Portillo Cáceres v. Paraguay, which addressed the death of a young farmer due to pesticide exposure and the poisoning of community members, the HRC concluded that Paraguay’s failure to prevent extensive aerial spraying with agro-toxic substances represented a foreseeable threat to life, thereby violating Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (see Moli for further details). At regional level, the ECtHR, has recognized the strong link between the right to life (Article 2 ECHR) and respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR) to environmental concerns. When life, health, well-being, and quality of life are jeopardized by environmental risks stemming from industrial activities, natural disasters, pollution, or climate change, states have positive obligations to implement preventive protective measures, even prior to the occurrence of actual harm (e.g. Kolyadenko and Others v Russia, Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others States, KlimaSeniorinnen v Switzerland, Cannavacciuolo and Others v Italy). Similarly, the IACtHR in advisory opinion OC-32/25 has affirmed that climate change affects the right to life and personal integrity, to health and to private and family life, thereby obligating states “to act with enhanced due diligence standards to comply with the duty of prevention arising from the obligation to guarantee the rights protected by the [ACHR]”(para 231). In SERAC & CESR v Nigeria, the ACommHPR found that environmental degradation resulting from oil extraction activities violated the health rights of the Ogoni people under Article 16 of ACHPR.

Environmental degradation can also infringe upon property and cultural rights, due to direct damage to homes and properties (SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria, Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Öneryildiz v. Turkey), forced evictions (SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Kenya, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua) or jeopardization of traditional ways of life for indigenous communities (Lhaka Honhat Association v. Argentina, Daniel Billy and others v. Australia) (ee the chapter on Regional Systems of International Human Rights Protections). These findings have also been affirmed by the ICJ in Advisory Opinion 187/25. Environmental degradation is not a marginal issue but a pervasive threat that undermines the fundamental principles of human rights. Substantive protection requires States to uphold not only negative obligations (to refrain from actions that harm or endanger life and health) but also positive obligations to prevent, protect, and promote a more sustainable and equitable world. In this way, human rights law embraces an integrated perspective, wherein environmental protection is essential for the full realization of human rights.

It must be highlighted that precarious humanitarian conditions, health issues, including eco-anxiety, and risk of death caused by climate events may well expose individuals to forms of ill-treatment under the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 7 of the ICCPR). However, human rights bodies have yet to examine climate-related cases under such provisions. While in Duarte Agostinho et al v Portugal and 32 Others this point was raised proprio motu by the Court itself, the case was then dismissed on inadmissibility grounds. Similarly, in Teitiota v New Zealand, the HRC suggested the potential relevance of this right; however, as noted by McAdam, it did not elaborate on this consideration as the applicant claimed only a violation of Article 2 of the ICCPR (right to life).

Procedural rights

In addition to substantive aspects, environmental degradation underscores the importance of procedural rights, specifically, those that ensure participation, transparency, and access to justice in environmental decision-making. Since 1992 Rio Declaration’s Principle 10, it has been established that environmental issues ‘are best handled with public participation’, stipulating that individuals have ‘appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities’. Consequently, these rights are not only instrumental; they are foundational to environmental democracy, empowering individuals and communities to actively engage in shaping the quality of their living environment. The 1998 European Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) and the Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazú Agreement) are crucial in this context, as they delineate the three core procedural rights: access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters.

Access to information is essential, as timely and reliable environmental data are crucial for citizens to understand and assess the environmental threats to which they are exposed. Initially the ECtHR adopted a restrictive approach; however, in light of the Aarhus Convention, it has since consistently determined that a government’s failure to conduct risk assessments and provide environmental information, including access to the conclusions of such studies, may constitute a violation of Article 8 and 10 of the ECHR, (e.g. Di Sarno and Others v Italy, Guerra and Others v. Italy, Taşkın and Others v. Turkey, Kotov v Russia). The IACtHR has developed a parallel jurisprudence on environmental information rights. In particular, in advisory opinion OC-32/25, the Court has established comprehensive state obligations regarding climate information, including to ‘(1) produce information; (2) disseminate and facilitate access to information and (3) adopt measures against disinformation’ (para 500). In doing so, it has also recognized ‘the human right to science and to the recognition of local, traditional, and indigenous knowledge (section C.2, paras 471 ff),’ stating that ‘all persons have the right to access the benefits of measures based on the best available science and the recognition of local, traditional, or indigenous knowledge’ (para 473).

Public participation in environmental decision-making is the second cornerstone, requiring that affected groups, including local and indigenous communities and NGOs, are allowed a substantive role in environmental decisions, such as infrastructure development, industrial permits and climate actions. International jurisprudence emphasizes that participation must be more than a mere procedural formality, it must be a genuine opportunity for public influence in environmental policy development and implementation. The IACtHR, building upon its consolidated case-law on indigenous rights (see section above), in advisory opinion OC-32/25 has reaffirmed that states must ‘strengthen the democratic rule of law as an essential framework for protecting human rights’ and ensure ‘open and inclusive citizen participation’ in climate governance (section C.1 , paras 460 ff and C.4, paras 530 ff). Similarly, the ACommHPR, in SERAC & CESR v Nigeria, has affirmed that oil extraction activities’ decisions required the fair and inclusive consultation of Ogoni people. In the same vein, the ECtHR has reiterated in several occasions the importance of ensuring that individuals are involved in the decision-making processes leading to decisions which could affect the environment and where their rights under the Convention are at stake (e.g. Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom; Giacomelli v. Italy; Brânduşe v. Romania).

The right of access to justice completes the trilogy. Effective protection of environmental human rights necessitates mechanisms to challenge harmful decisions, seek remediation for damages, and access remedies also beyond national systems when required. The ECtHR has addressed access to justice in environmental contexts through both Article 6 (fair trial) and Article 13 (effective remedy). In KlimaSeniorinnen v Swizterland, the Court has found Switzerland violated Article 6 due to the domestic court’s failure to seriously engage with the examination of the case. Notably, the Court has expanded the concept of locus standi to allow NGOs, under certain conditions, to have standing even where their members would not qualify as victims individually. This expansion is based on the recognition that recourse to collective bodies such as NGOs may be one of the few means available for victims to effectively defend their interests due to the diffuse and severe impacts of climate change, including those felt across generations (para 499). In the same vein, the IACtHR, in advisory opinion OC-32/25 has established detailed access to justice requirements for climate cases, including: ‘(1) the provision of sufficient resources for the administration of justice in this context, (2) the application of the pro actione principle’, requiring courts to interpret procedural rules favourably to enable access to justice rather than creating barriers to judicial review; ‘(3) the guarantee of reasonable time limits; (4) adequate provisions regarding standing, as well as (5) evidence, and (6) redress’ (para 541).

In this context, the protection of environmental defenders, who are at the forefront of these struggles, has emerged as a crucial procedural right. The Aarhus Convention already provides for the protection of such category of people, although indirectly. However, the increasing targeting of these defenders by governments and corporations has recently prompted the establishment of a legally binding rapid response mechanism of protection, through the election of a Special Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur is to take urgent action to protect individuals at risk of or subjected to penalization, persecution, or harassment for exercising their rights under the Convention, including activists, scientists, journalists, indigenous peoples, and community members. Similar concerns have arisen in Latin America, particularly regarding to indigenous environmental defenders. In this regard, the Escazú Agreement, in force since April 2021, is the first international treaty explicitly referring to environmental defenders. In particular, Article 9 obliges States Parties ‘to guarantee a safe and enabling environment for individuals, groups, and organizations that promote and defend human rights in environmental matters, so they are able to act free from threat, restriction and insecurity’. By recalling these principles, the IACtHR, in advisory opinion OC-32/25 has recognized states’ special duties of protection towards environmental defenders, including obligations to investigate attacks, prevent criminalization, and ensure defender security (para 566 and Section C.6, para 561 ff).

The right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment

The right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment is now recognized as a fundamental aspect of the human rights framework concerning environmental issues. While this right its origins in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which asserted the ‘fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being’; however, the initial articulation of this right did not immediately result in legally binding obligations. Core international human rights treaties from that period, such as the ICCPR and ICESCR did not contain explicit environmental rights provisions. The formal acknowledgement of the right to a healthy environment as a legally enforceable entitlement is a comparatively recent phenomenon, predominantly associated with the emergence of ‘solidarity rights’ or third-generation human rights.

As illustrated in Chapter 4, the development of solidarity rights has been influenced by ecological and future-oriented perspectives emerging from the Global South, driven by escalating global challenges such as the triple planetary crisis of pollution, biodiversity loss, and climate change. Consequently, the earliest codification of this right was observed primarily in the African and Latin-American contexts. Notably, Article 24 of the ACHPR recognises the right of all peoples to a satisfactory environment conducive to their development, establishing the African system as a pioneer in this domain. In the Americas, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), through Article 11, similarly acknowledges the right to a healthy environment. However, the right was found as justiciable under Article 26 of the ACHR in advisory opinion OC-23/17, due to lack of enforceability under Article 11 of the Protocol of San Salvador.

This recognition has accelerated in the context of an increasing number of environmental and climate cases presented before human rights bodies, as noted in the sections above, alongside the proactive engagement of UN Special Rapporteurs dedicated to this issue. As a result, over 80% of UN member states have explicitly incorporated the right to a healthy environment in their constitutions or statutory frameworks, reflecting its widespread acceptance. This trend has been further reinforced by the ICJ in Advisory Opinion 187/25 which declared that ‘a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment is a precondition for the enjoyment of many human rights, such as the rights to life, health, and an adequate standard of living, as well as access to water, food, and housing’ (para. 393). On this basis, the ICJ concluded that ‘the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment is therefore inherent to the enjoyment of all other human rights’ (para. 393), thereby endorsing it as a binding norm of international law. Given its widespread recognition, Judges Aurescu (para. 46), Bhandari (para. 3), and Tladi (para. 31) in their separate opinions have expressed the view that the right has also attained the status of customary international law.

Recent climate litigation has confirmed the central role of the right to a healthy environment at regional level, while divergences persist. In advisory opinion OC-32/25, the IACtHR has confirmed that ‘the human right to healthy environmental [is] a fundamental right for the existence of humanity’, which ‘protects the components of the environment, [including the climate system] even in the absence of certainty or evidence of the risk to the individual’, (paras 272,273 and sections B.1.4 ad B.1.5). In doing so, the Court has emphasized that the obligations to preserve the environment and its components ‘are of peremptory importance and are therefore of a jus cogence nature’ (para 291). In contrast, the European system remains the only regional system that has yet to incorporate this right. While some contend that the ECtHR case-law implicitly acknowledges the right to a healthy environment, a formal recognition ‘would provide broader and more complete Convention protection of the potential right secured by the Court’ (see concurring opinion Judge Serghides in Kotov and others v Russia). Scholars suggest that the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion 187/25 may offer the opportunity for the Council of Europe to move toward the adoption of additional protocol to the ECHR, recognizing the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, as requested by UN experts and civil society.

With regard to the scope of the right, since the pioneering work of Knox, who served as the first UN Special Rapporteur on human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, culminating in the 2018 Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, both substantive and procedural obligations have been identified to ensure effective protection and implementation of this right.

Figure 1: Substantive and procedural obligations in a snapshot

Substantive obligations require states to actively protect the core elements of the environment: clean air through monitoring, standards, and action plans; a safe climate by phasing out fossil fuels and shifting to renewable energy; safe and sufficient water through rights-based allocation and enforcement; healthy and sustainably produced food by transforming industrial agriculture; non-toxic environments by eliminating hazardous substances and rehabilitating contaminated sites; and healthy ecosystems through conservation, protection, and restoration of biodiversity. Procedural obligations guarantee transparency and participation by ensuring accessible environmental information and comprehensive education; meaningful public participation in all environmental decision-making, especially for vulnerable populations; environmental impact assessments for all relevant projects; affordable access to justice and effective remedies; gender equality integration; respect for Indigenous Peoples’ rights including free, prior, and informed consent; and protection of environmental human rights defenders from intimidation and violence.

Recent legal developments have provided greater clarity in the context of climate change. The IACtHR in advisory opinion OC-32/25, in particular, has recognized the right to a healthy climate as a substantive element of the right to a healthy environment, which ‘derives from a climate system free from anthropogenic interference that is dangerous to humans and to Nature as a whole’ (para 300). Both the IACtHR in advisory opinion OC-32/25 and the ICJ in Advisory Opinion 187/25, have interpreted the right to a healthy environment as encompassing specific obligations for states to take all necessary measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change, including the regulation of corporate activities (see below). This also underscores extraterritorial components due to the global nature of the challenge.

Extraterritoriality

Extraterritorial obligations under human rights law in the context of environmental and climate protection represent a growing yet debated field. This reflects the increasing recognition that environmental degradation resulting from one state’s activities can adversely affect the rights of individuals and communities beyond its borders. The ICJ has long acknowledged the ‘no harm’ rule under international environmental law which mandates states to prevent, reduce, and control the risk of significant transboundary environmental degradation (see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Pulp Mills, Costa Rica v Nicaragua). While the ‘no harm’ rule underlines a duty of prevention – a fundamental principle of human rights law – only recent developments have begun to establish human rights extraterritorial obligations concerning environmental harm.

As discussed in Chapter 4, States are traditionally bound to respect, protect and fulfil human rights within their jurisdiction, which is the territory over they have control, in spite of the existence of some instances of extraterritorial applicability. However, environmental harm does not know national borders, necessitating a re-evaluation of this conventional understanding. It is noteworthy that solidarity rights, closely associated with the emergence of these issues, such as the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment and the right to (sustainable) development, have been framed as having extraterritorial dimensions. IACtHR’ s advisory opinion OC-23/17 marked a watershed in this field, as it held for the first time for a human rights body that, under the ACHR, ‘jurisdiction […] is more extensive than the territory of a State’ (para 104(c)). In particular, the Court stated that:

As highlighted by Rocha and Feria-Tinta & Milnes, the IACtHR has established that jurisdiction may arise from control over the source of harm (but not the victim), i.e. “the activities carried out that caused the harm and consequent violation of human rights”(para 104(h)), in addition to control over the territory and control over the victim himself. The Court has confirmed this stance, in advisory opinion OC-32/25 and in particular in relation to the right to a healthy environment, thereby elucidating its extraterritorial implications in the context of climate change (para 278). This approach has been followed by CRC Committee, which in Sacchi et al. v. Argentina et al. and in General Comment No. 26 (paras 88 and 108) held that effective control over the source of transboundary environmental harm is sufficient to trigger extraterritorial obligations towards children “whatever their location.”

This understanding is “not alien” to the ECtHR; however, the Court has adopted a stricter approach. In Duarte Agostinho v Portugal and 32 Others – a case initiated by a group of Portuguese youth against several European countries claiming ECHR’s violations due to their contribution to transboundary greenhouse gas emissions – the Court explicitly referenced the position of the IACtHR and CRC (para. 210). Nevertheless, it clarified that ‘both [bodies] are based on a different notion of jurisdiction, which, however, has not been recognized in the [ECtHR]’s case-law’ (para. 212). According to its case-law, the Court determined that jurisdiction “requires [effective] control over the person himself” (para. 205). Any other conclusion would lead to “a critical lack of foreseeability” and allow cases from “anyone adversely affected by climate change wherever in the world he or she might feel its effects” (para. 206). As a result, it found the claim of the applicants relating to extraterritorial climate impacts inadmissible absent such control. This stance was confirmed in subsequent similar cases where the Court declared the application inadmissible based on the lack of jurisdiction (see Uricchio v Italy and 31 Others and De Conto v Italy and 32 Others).

As noted by Murcott, Tigre, and Zimmermann, the Court missed the opportunity to expand its notion of jurisdiction. However, it remains to be seen whether this position will evolve in future climate cases, particularly in light of the ICJ’s advisory opinion 187/25 on this matter. The latter, by drawing from its past case-law (e.g. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory), has indeed reaffirmed that in the era of climate change, states should not be allowed to escape responsibility for transboundary harms by simply invoking territorial boundaries (para 394 ff). While the ICJ maintained its finding, as it held that human rights treaties can apply extraterritorially without clarifying the exact scope of such extraterritoriality, the international legal landscape is increasingly shaped by an understanding that effective protection from environmental harm cannot be confined to national borders. As a matter of fact, the ICJ has recognized that, under customary international law, states have a duty to cooperate for the protection of the environment. In particular, it has stated that cooperation is ‘the very foundation of meaningful efforts respect to climate change’ (para 302). Cooperation entails by nature extraterritorial components as it requires transnational efforts to address communal goals such as mitigating and adapting to climate change. This duty is also intrinsically linked to the customary norm to prevent transboundary environmental harm, which again underpins extraterritorial obligations including the “use all the means at disposal in order to avoid activities […], causing significant damage to the environment of another State” (paras 271 ff). Given that, climate obligations cannot be understood in isolation from human rights, and vice versa (para 404) the Court appears to suggest that global challenges in an interconnected world demands growing extraterritorial obligations under human rights law.

From Environmental to Climate and Planetary Justice

Environmental issues have historically been linked to justice movements, with considerations of equity, fairness, inclusion and social justice woven into environmental advocacy. This reflects a growing awareness of how environmental harms disproportionately impact certain segments of the population, highlighting the necessity for justice considerations to inform environmental law and policy. Justice’s discourses have undergone significant transformation over time.

Concerns regarding environmental justice began to surface in the United States during the 1980s, largely through the emergence of the environmental justice movement. This movement sought to highlight the racial and socio-economic dimensions of environmental harm by exposing patterns of discrimination in the systematic placement of hazardous facilities near low-income and people of colour communities. This practice, encapsulated by the term “environmental racism” is exemplified by case law such as Mossville Action Now v. United States, in which the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR) determined that the concentration of polluting facilities in the African American community of Mossville, Louisiana—referred to as “Cancer Alley” due to its high levels of pollution—constituted a violation of non-discrimination obligations.

Other examples of environmental racism that have been condemned by human rights bodies include the Dakota Access Pipeline, imposed on the Standing Rock Sioux without their consent, and the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, where a predominantly African American community was exposed to elevated levels of lead in their water supply. The latter case was also brought to public attention by documentary film-maker Michael Moore in Fahrenheit 11/9 (2018).

In two reports published in 2022, UN special rapporteurs, Boyd and Achiume, used the term “sacrifices zones” to describe those areas affected by environmental racism or other forms of discrimination causing gross violations of human rights. All these cases underscore the necessity for both distributive justice, which entails equitable distribution of environmental benefits and burdens, and procedural justice, which emphasises fair and meaningful participation in decision-making processes.

As scientific understanding has expanded, the discourse surrounding justice has increasingly focused on climate change, with the concept of ‘climate justice’ gaining traction to address the compounded vulnerabilities faced by certain groups in the climate crisis. Notably, Sultana argues that climate justice critically examines how global warming “impacts people differently, unevenly, and disproportionately, as well as redressing the resultant injustices in fair and equitable ways.” The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC) stated in Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC acknowledges that while all states share a responsibility to address climate change, these responsibilities vary based on historical contributions and current capabilities, with developed countries bearing a greater burden. Furthermore, the recognition that climate change exacerbates vulnerabilities—particularly for women, children, disabled individuals, indigenous peoples, and communities in the Global South (see the 2015 Paris Agreement) —highlights the concerns of climate justice within international climate treaties.

The increasing acknowledgment of the interplay between climate change and pre-existing inequalities – encompassing gender-discrimination, racism, ageism, classism, ableism, neoliberalism, neocolonialism and geographical vulnerability – has prompted scholars to examine climate change through the lens of intersectionality (see the chapter on Gender and Human Rights). An intersectional approach more effectively captures the complexity of the intertwined realities of marginalisation within the context of climate change “to forge [an] adaptive and critically reflexive response to climate injustice.” This means that climate justice cannot be pursued in isolation from other justice claims. Climate justice typically encopasses the need for a “just transition” to renewable economies, equitable adaptation and mitigation policies, and participatory governance that challenge entrenched power structures while integrating Indigenous knowledge and local solutions, ensuring that no one is left behind.

Climate justice considerations have increasingly been addressed by human rights bodies. The UN Human Rights Council has repeatedly emphasized the disproportionate effects of climate change on vulnerable people and the necessity of rectifying such inequalities through climate policies. Those concerns have also emerged in climate litigation. In KlimaSeniorinnen v Swizterland, the applicants highlighted gender and age considerations when alleging human rights violations stemming from the disproportionate impacts of climate change on elderly women. In Duarte Agostinho and others v. Portugal and 32 Others, the applicants, in line with a growing trend, raised issues of intergenerational equity and the rights of future generations (see the chapter on the Types of Obligations in International Human Rights Law). In Müllner v. Austria, the applicant, a person with multiple sclerosis and Uhthoff’s Syndrome, suffering acute heat sensitivity, drew attention to his disability. In the same vein, the IACtHR and the ICJ have emphasised that “climate change exacerbates inequality and poverty” (advisory opinion OC-32/25, para 623), noting that indigenous peoples, women, children and people with disability, are affected by climate change in distinct ways (advisory opinion OC-32/25, paras 595-596, advisory opinion 187/25, paras 374ff). While human rights bodies have begun to address these issues, their approach has appeared cautious. Lupin, Tigre and Urzola criticized the ECtHR for its inadequate engagement with gendered vulnerabilities in KlimaSeniorinnen v Switzerland, despite the gender-sensitive approach adopted in gender-based violence cases (see the chapter on Gender and Human Rights). Similarly, while the ICJ in advisory opinion 187/25 affirmed obligations to protect vulnerable groups, it fell short of articulating robust intersectional approaches and their legal implications. This lack of engagement has been criticized by Judges Sebutinde, Charlesworth and Aurescu, including in the context of climate-induced migration.

Recent justice debates have pushed even beyond to advocate for a broader paradigm of ‘planetary justice’ that includes non-human living beings and Earth’s critical systems as essential components of justice claims. Planetary justice challenges the human-centred focus of traditional justice discourses, promoting integrated ecological approaches that respect the rights of animals, plants, ecosystems, and the climate system as a whole, recognizing their fundamental role in sustaining life and the urgent need to safeguard planetary boundaries. This shift is reflected in academic literature that calls for planetary law paradigms, emphasizing a holistic approach that balanced the needs of present and future generations with those of the non-human world, foregrounding the ethical imperative of living within Earth’s ecological limits.

While human rights bodies have not yet fully embraced a broader concept of justice, there are indications that they are adopting a more holistic understanding of environmental issues. As noted by Fleurke & Somsen and Wewerinke-Singh, in advisory opinion 187/25, the ICJ recognizes that ‘[environmental issues pose an] existential problem of planetary proportions that imperils all forms of life and the very health of our planet’. This acknowledgement appears to blur traditional legal dichotomies such as ‘human/nature, local/global, private/public and present/future’, thereby providing an integrated perspective of the tapestry of states’ obligations in the climate crisis context (video min. 28:15). It is particularly significant that the ICJ identifies principles such as equity, intergenerational equity, CBDR-RC and sustainable development as ‘guiding principles for the interpretation and application’ of the law, including human rights law (para 161). Similar considerations apply to the IACtHR’s advisory opinion OC-32/25. In both instances, this integrated interpretation reflects more ‘differentiated, future‑oriented, and justice‑centred’ approaches such as: a) the recognition of the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment (see above) and of the rights of nature which, as already suggested by Feria-Tinta, go some way toward correcting law’s present-oriented anthropocentric model; b) the recognition of the duty for states to regulate the conduct of corporations contributing to environmental degradation, which promotes a shift towards a genuinely sustainable development model, wherein the phase-out of fossil fuel may be seen not as an option but as a legal obligation.

Human Rights and Business

Unlike states, businesses traditionally do not have direct obligations under international human rights law to ensure the protection of human rights. However, there is a growing recognition that corporations must respect human rights, including by preventing environmental harm. This reflects the scientifically established understanding that corporations, particularly those in the fossil fuel sector, known as “Carbon Majors” are contributing to the current triple planetary crisis and associated human rights violations.

Early regulatory efforts primarily emerged through voluntary initiatives, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the ILO Tripartite Declaration, UN Global Compact. These initiatives culminated in the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) which established the foundational framework for corporate human rights responsibilities. The UNGPs rest on three pillars: (1) the state duty to protect human rights against business-related human rights abuses; (2) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and (3) access to remedy for the victims of business-related human rights abuses. It was then followed by the Children’s Rights and Business Principle. While acknowledging the potential adverse impacts of business activities on human rights, these instruments provide soft-law standards and offer limited references to environmental degradation. The latter has been increasingly incorporated under the influence of human rights bodies and the rise of climate litigation.

John H. Knox and David R. Boyd, both former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to clean, healthy and sustainable environment, along with Surya Deva, UN Special Rapporteur on the right to (sustainable) development, have consistently articulated the responsibilities of states towards corporations and the obligations of corporations under international human rights law in the environmental context. Furthermore, recent years have witnessed a surge in human rights–based climate litigation related to corporate activities, especially in the US and Europe. This trend coincides with the growing number of Global North countries imposing mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence obligations on businesses. While climate litigation typically target states, as they are primary duty-bearers in international human rights law, there is an emerging practice of directly addressing corporations, with notable cases involving major corporations such as Shell, Eni, ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies.

In Milieudefensie et al v. Royal Dutch Shell plc, representing the first case of this kind, the Dutch court ordered Shell to reduce its GHG emissions by 45% by 2030, relying on Dutch tort law, interpreted in light of the UNGPs, which were considered an ‘authoritative and internationally endorsed soft law instrument, which set out the responsibilities of states and businesses in relation to human rights’. In Falys v. TotalEnergies, a farmer filed a lawsuit against Belgian TotalEnergies for climate-related damages deemed to constitute human rights violations. The plaintiff has requested that the company adopt a credible green transition plan in line with the 2015 Paris Agreement. In Lliuya v. RWE, a Peruvian farmer sought compensation from German RWE AG for its contribution to glacial melting threatening his community. The Court found that, in principle, major greenhouse gas emitters can be held directly liable for the impacts of their emissions, including transnational climate damages. Similar cases have also emerged in UK, with Lungowe v Vedanta Resources, Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell and Limbu v Dyson setting crucial precedents in transforming tort litigation against corporations for human rights abuses and paving the way for climate-related accountability, including parent companies liability. In US, Multnomah County has filed a lawsuit against several of the largest oil and coal-producing corporations (Exxon Mobil, Shell, Chevron, BP, ConocoPhillips, Motiva, Occidental Petroleum, Anadarko Petroleum etc.) for the 2021 Pacific Northwest Heat Dome. In the Global South, the ‘Carbon Majors Inquiry’, conducted by the Philippines Human Rights Commission investigated the responsibilities of major fossil companies for climate harms to the Filipino population, concluding that these corporations can be held accountable.

While corporations are under increasing pressure to address climate change, with climate litigation expanding into new areas, such as false claims of action, known as ‘greenwashing’ or ‘climate-washing’ (e.g. Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp.), banks funding fossil fuel projects (e.g. ClientEarth v. Belgian National Bank) or cases concerning disclosure of investments in high-emitting GHG activities (e.g. ClientEarth v. European Investment Bank), ‘anti-climate’ cases are also starting to flourish. Anti-climate cases are those cases where actors, in particular corporations, use the courtroom to delay or derail climate action. This strategy couples corporate lobbying to maintain the current regulatory status quo with calls for diluted or limited climate actions. This is why, in the recent years, human rights bodies have been tasked with articulating states’ binding obligations toward corporate conduct.

With SERAC and CESR v. Nigeria  as the first case on such issues to be examined by a human rights body (see above), and Greenpeace Nordic and Others v Norway, a case concerning the validity of granting petroleum exploration licences in the Barents Sea, still pending before the ECtHR, recent advisory opinions of the ICJ and of the IACtHR represent the most significant developments in this area of law. In particular, in advisory opinion OC-32/25, the IACtHR has clarified that “the standard of enhanced due diligence” required of states to protect the climate system includes adopting “legislative and other measures to prevent human rights violations committed by public and private enterprises” (para 345). As Dorman, Iyer and Jost-Creegan note, this means in particular, passing legislation that codifies corporate human rights and climate due diligence throughout supply chains, ensures transparency on GHG emissions and diligence practices, combates corporate greenwashing and disinformation and establishes differentiated obligations based on companies’ current and historical contributions to climate change, with stricter duties imposed on high-emitting Carbon Majors (paras 347ff).

Similarly, in advisory opinion 187/25 the ICJ confirmed that states have a binding duty to regulate the activities of private actors within their jurisdiction or control (see above on extraterritoriality) in order to prevent harmful climate effects (para 428), particularly the production, consumption, licensing and subsidising of fossil fuels (para 427). In their joint declaration, Judges Bhandari and Cleveland, argued that “the Court could have been more forceful in addressing these specific issues” (para 4). They further elaborated on these obligations by affirming that, in line with climate science, this means “phasing out the production and use of fossil fuels, transitioning away from fossil fuels and regulating fossil fuels in a manner that does not undermine global co-operation to achieve these goals” (para 22).

Despite the above-mentioned backlashes, these developments demonstrate an increasing awareness of the inherent connection between protecting the Earth’s health, human rights and business activities. In this context, it the need for a legally binding framework has indeed emerged. In 2014, the HRC passed Resolution 26/9, which mandated an open-ended intergovernmental working group “to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.” As negotiations are still ongoing and six drafts of the treaty have been produced to date, scholars argue that the recent legal developments, in particular, the ICJ’s advisory opinion may have some influence on the content of the final draft.

Nature’s Rights

The concept of the rights of nature has emerged from a critique of Western anthropocentric legal system, including international human rights law. This recognises only humans (and increasingly human constructs such as corporations) as rights-holders, favouring nature only insofar as it benefits human beings, rather than recognising it as a subject deserving of intrinsic legal protection. This critique has been most powerfully expressed by indigenous communities, for whom land, rivers, mountains, and forests are recognized as kin or ancestors, imbued with agency and deserving respect which must protected through systems of reciprocity and responsibility that fundamentally reject the reduction of nature to property or exploitable resource. Inspired by these perspectives, rights of nature movements have emerged, calling for a shift from human-centred paradigms to systemic, eco-centric models of law. Within this climate, rights of nature have gained increasing legal recognition through constitutional provisions, legislation, and judicial decisions in multiple jurisdictions.

In 2008, Ecuador became the first country to grant legal personhood and autonomous rights to nature in its constitution. This was followed in 2009 by Bolivia which recognized the rights of Mother Earth (Pachamama) and then other countries enacted laws, or were marked by landmark domestic cases recognizing natural entities as legal persons with fundamental rights. For example, Te Urewera Act 2014 in New Zealand recognized the Te Urewera forest as a legal person endowing with ‘all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person’. Similarly, the Te Awa Tupua Act 2017 recognized the Whanganui River as an indivisible, living entity with rights and interests. In Colombia, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Justice and the First Criminal Court of Neiva, declared the Atrato River in 2016, the Amazon rainforest in 2018, and the Magdalena River in 2019, to be subjects of rights, respectively. More recently, Spain has enacted a specific legislation to grant legal personhood to the Mar Menor Lagoon. These decisions typically include the appointment of joint guardianship between government institutions and affected communities, ensuring representation of the interests of natural entities and compliance with their rights. Some jurisdictions have created specialized institutions for nature’s rights implementation. For example, Bolivia has set up the Mother Earth Ombudsman to defend the rights of Mother Earth and investigate violations.

The rights of nature are also gaining traction at an international level. In 2010, the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth adopted the Declaration on Universal Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth which states that ‘Mother Earth and all beings are entitled to all the inherent rights recognized in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as may be made between organic and inorganic beings, species, origin, use to human beings, or any other status.’ The International Rights of Nature Tribunal, a civil society-driven initiative that investigates and publicizes violations of nature’s rights while advocating for stronger legal protection, was also launched in 2014. The Tribunal has addressed cases involving mining, fracking, fossil fuel extraction, and other activities alleged to violate nature’s rights: however, its decisions are not legally binding.

The most relevant recent legal development came from the IACtHR with advisory opinion OC-32/25. For the first time, a human rights body, stated that nature and its components are subjects of legal rights. Based on its case-law regarding indigenous communities’ rights and climate science the Court recognized that “protection of the global climate system requires safeguarding the integrity of ecosystems and the living and non-living components” (para 314). In doing so, it has also stated that this requires “integrated legal approach, capable of uniting the protection of human rights of present and future generation and the rights of Nature” (para 315). Following this line of reasoning, the IACtHR has confirmed that “the recognition of Nature and its components as subjects of rights constitutes a normative development that permits reinforcing the protection of the long-term integrity and functionality of ecosystems” (paras 279-280). Furthermore, the IACtHR has clarified that the rights of nature do not conflict with human rights but rather complement them. Tensions can indeed arise between human rights and nature’s rights when human activities necessary for rights enjoyment conflict with ecological protection. Balancing these interests requires careful consideration of both human dignity and ecological limits. In this regard, the Court views the rights of nature as strengthening the environmental protection necessary for enjoyment of human rights, and as contributing ‘to the consolidation of a truly sustainable developmental model which respects planetary limits and guarantees the availability of vital resources for present and future generations’ (para 279).

While practical challenges still remain, such as extending the scope and the standing of natural entities in litigation, the rights of nature are increasingly being considered as a response to and a remedy to current environmental challenges. This has also led them to enter the political mainstream. During the negotiations at  COP15 under the Convention on Biological Diversity, in 2022, the Parties adopted the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Although not legally binding, this framework, by setting global goals and targets by 2050 for the conservation of biodiversity, recognizes “the Rights of Nature or rights of nature and rights of Mother Earth as being an integral part of its successful implementation” (Section C(b)) in combination to a human-rights based approach (Section C(g)), thus promoting a vision of living in harmony with nature.

Further Reading 

Boer Ben and Mwanza Rosemary, ‘The Converging Regimes of Human Rights and Environmental Protection in International Law’ Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 20/09 (2020)

Cullen Miriam, ‘Climate Change, Colonialism, and Human Rights in Greenland’ in Petra Butler and Jean-Pierre Gauci (eds), Human Rights and Small States (Springer, forthcoming, 2022)

Cusato Eliana, ‘Of violence and (in)visibility: the securitisation of climate change in international law’ (2022) 10 London Review of International Law 203

Duffy Helen, ‘Climate Change and the Extra-Territorial Scope of Human Rights Obligations; Global Threats and Fragmented Responses’ in Dam Blokker and V Prisland (eds), Furthering the Frontiers of International Law: Sovereignty, Human Rights, Sustainable Development (Brill, 2021)

Koppe Erik, ‘Climate Change and Human Security During Armed Conflict’ (2014) 8 Human Rights & International Legal Discourse 68

Lustig Doreen and Gabison Ilil, ‘How Climate Change Jurisprudence Alters Human Rights from Within: Between Distributive Justice and Human Rights Concerns’ (2023)

Mardikian Lisa and Galani Sofia, ‘Protecting the Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Livelihoods in the Face of Climate Change: The Potential of Regional Human Rights Law and the Law of the Sea’ (2023) 23 Human Rights Law Review 1

Nolan Aoife, Placing future generations at the heart of Inter-American human rights law? (EJIL:Talk! 21 July 2025);

Nolan Aoife, Inter-generational Equity, Future Generations and Democracy in the European Court of Human Rights’ Klimaseniorinnen Decision (EJIL:Talk! 15 April 2024);

Venn Alice, ‘Rendering International Human Rights Law Fit for Purpose on Climate Change’ (2023) 23 Human Rights Law Review 1

British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) (28 July 2025) ‘Rapid Response Webinar: Legal Reflections on the ICJ’s Climate Advisory Opinion and Beyond’

Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) (24 July 2025) ‘A Verdict for the Planet: Legal and Political Reflections on the ICJ Climate Ruling’

Geneva Environment Network and CIEL (10 September 2025) ‘States’ duty to regulate corporations in the face of triple planetary crisis – HRC60 Side Event’

NYU Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice (19 January 2024): The Rise of Climate Litigation: A Conversation with UN Special Rapporteur Ian Fry

Micheal Moore: Fahrenheit 11/9 (2018)

Columbia Law School – Sabin Center for Climate Change Law – Climate Law Blog

Suggested Citation – Erika Moranduzzo, ‘Human Rights and the Environment’ in Stuart Wallace and Clare James (eds), Open Access International Human Rights Law (University of Leeds, 2026)